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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(i) (1953 as amended) whereby a defendant in a criminal 
case may take an appeal to the Supreme Court from a final judgment 
and conviction for a first degree felony. Mr. Ramirez was convicted 
of Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended), in the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
v 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error when it 
denied Mr. Ramirez's motion to suppress the identification and 
subsequent statements and evidence as fruits of an unlawful seizure? 
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in denying 
Mr. Ramirez's motion to suppress the identification testimony of 
Gerald Wilson inasmuch as it was the product of suggestive showup 
procedures and inherently unreliable? 
3. Did the prosecutor's comments in opening statement and 
closing argument prejudice Mr. Ramirez's right to a fair trial as 
constitutionally guaranteed? 
4. Did insufficient evidence exist to convict Mr. Ramirez 
of the crime of Aggravated Robbery? 
TEXT OF STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment IV reads: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, 
and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Constitution of the United States, Amendment XIV reads in pertinent 
part: 
Section 1. 
. . . No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any 
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §7 reads: 
Sec. 7. [Due Process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §12 reads: 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall 
have the right to appear and defend in person and 
by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to 
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own 
behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an 
impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
vii 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance 
shall any accused person, before final judgment, 
be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall 
not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against 
her husbnad, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the 
same offense. 
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §14 reads: 
Sec. 14, [Unreasonable searches forbidden— 
Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be 
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon 
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the person or thing to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-30 reads: 
76-6-302. Aggravated robbery.—(1) A person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the course of 
committing robbery, he: 
(a) Uses a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a knife or a 
deadly weapon; or 
(b) Causes serious bodily injury upon 
another . 
(2) Aggravated robbery is a felony of the 
first degree. 
(3) For the purposes of this part, an act 
shall be deemed to be "in the course of committing 
a robbery" if it occurs in an attempt to commit, 
during the commission of, or in the immediate 
flight after the attempt or commission of a 
robbery. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 reads: 
77-7-15. Authority of peace officer to stop and 
question suspect—Grounds. A peace officer may 
stop any person in a public place when he has a 
viii 
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed 
or is in the act of committing or is attempting to 
commit a public offense and may demand his name, 
address and an explanation of his actions. 
IX 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
LIVIO ALPHONSO RAMIREZ, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880425 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Ramirez appeals from a judgment and conviction for 
Aggravated Robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-302 (1953 as amended) following a jury trial held 
July 11-13, 1988 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat, 
Judge, presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early morning hours of August 13, 1987, Kathy 
Davis, store manager of the Redwood Road and Sixth North Pizza Hut 
was leaving the restaurant accompanied by her husband, John Davis, 
and her brother, Gerald Wilson (R. 212 at 26-27). A man approached 
them and, holding a lead pipe, accosted Kathy Davis, demanding she 
give him the bank bag containing the day's receipts (R. 212 at 
29-30). Mrs. Davis informed him she didn't have the bag, but he 
insisted she give him the money and pushed and shoved her into the 
car (R. 212 at 31-32). Mr. Wilson attempted to restrain the 
individual, who then struck him with the pipe and demanded that they 
not move (R. 212 at 85-86). The man then instructed Mrs. Davis to 
enter the restaurant, get the money and return (R. 212 at 33-34, 
86). With some difficulty, Mrs. Davis entered the restaurant, 
obtained the money and returned (R. 212 at 35-36). 
In the interim, Mr. Wilson again attempted to stop the 
robber, who then swung the lead pipe but failed to hit Mr. Wilson 
only because he struck the drain pipe above Mr. Wilson's head 
(R. 212 at 86). He then told Mr. Wilson and Mr. Davis, who also 
remained outside the restaurant, that if they were to move, the 
other man would shoot them (R. 212 at 86-87). This reference to a 
second individual was the initial recognition of any of the other 
parties that a second robber was involved (R. 212 at 47; R. 213 at 
44, 65). Both Mr. and Mrs. Davis testified that this individual was 
toward the corner of the building in the shadows (R. 212 at 58, 
74). Mr. Wilson, however, testified that he saw the individual for 
between mere seconds and one minute, looking him in the face (R. 213 
at 45) . 
Police officers were then called to investigate the 
robbery; Officer Vida Travis of the Salt Lake City Police Department 
responded to the call and interviewed witnesses (R. 215 at 2-3). 
Mr. Davis described the robber carrying the pipe as a male Mexican 
from eighteen to nineteen years old, six feet, slender, short dark 
hair, and brown eyes. He described this man with the pipe as 
wearing a white bandana, a red and white baseball cap (R. 215 at 
4-5). He described the second individual as eighteen to nineteen 
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years old, five feet six inches tall, slender, brown eyes, Levis, 
white bandana over his face, also wearing a red and white baseball 
cap and holding a gun or revolver (R. 215 at 4-6). 
Mr. Wilson's description given to Officer Travis was that 
the man with the pipe was a male Mexican between the ages of 
twenty-one to twenty-two, five feet seven to five feet eight inches 
tall, one hundred fifty-five to one hundred sixty pounds. He had 
shaggy brown hair, brown eyes, a blue sweater and Levis, and was 
wearing a white scarf (R. 215 at 6). Mr. Wilson also testified that 
the man with the pipe had one front tooth missing and a bald spot on 
one side of his head (R. 215 at 7). Mr. Wilson described the second 
individual, the man with the gun, as five feet nine inches to six 
feet tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levis, with a white scarf 
across his face (R. 215 at 7). 
Descriptions were called into police headquarters and a 
dispatch was issued for male Mexicans (R. 215 at 8) (see Exhibit 1 
attached at Addendum A). 
Mr. Ramirez is five feet ten inches tall. He weighs one 
hundred sixty pounds. He is an Apache Indian with some Spanish 
heritage and he wears his hair shoulder length due to his Indian 
religion. He has worn his hair the same for five years (R. 212 at 
238, 241). Mr. Ramirez speaks no foreign language (R. 212 at 251). 
He has three tattoos on his arm—a rose, an "L" and a little drummer 
boy—which are all visible when wearing his sleeveless sweatshirt 
(R. 212 at 250-51). Mr. Ramirez has never had a bald spot on his 
head, and he has not had a missing tooth since childhood (R. 212 at 
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239). On August 13, 1987, Mr. Ramirez was wearing Levis and a dark 
blue sweatshirt with cut-off sleeves with paint splattered all over 
the front of it (R. 212 at 173-75). He was also wearing a brown 
baseball cap (R. 212 at 175). 
At approximately 1:00 a.m., Police Officer Merrill Stuck 
was cruising in his marked police car with headlights off in an area 
south of the Pizza Hut, searching for a female runaway (R. 213 at 
9). As he drove up Morton Drive near 650 North, he observed two 
individuals whom he believed to be walking together toward him 
(R. 213 at 6-8). At a point where he believed the individuals 
initially recognized the car as a police cruiser, one of the 
individuals took off running (R. 213 at 6). Officer Stuck could not 
describe this person other than to say he was wearing a light-
colored shirt (R. 212 at 178-79). Officer Stuck had been looking 
for the female runaway with his radio turned off and was unaware of 
the recent Pizza Hut robbery (R. 213 at 10). However, he then 
turned on his radio and broadcast that an individual had just run 
upon sighting him and that he was going to "shake" another 
individual (R. 213 at 14; R. 211 at 6). He then exited his car and 
approached the second individual, demanding identification and 
explanations (R. 213 at 8, 21). This other individual identified 
himself as Mr. Livio Alphonso Ramirez, the Appellant in this case 
(R. 213 at 21). 
Mr. Ramirez clarified through his testimony that Officer 
Stuck exited his car and demanded he stop, place his hands in the 
air and that the officer had his hand on his gun (R. 215 at 12). 
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Officer Stuck did not recall whether he had ordered Mr. Ramirez to 
put his hands up when he first approached him, but he did respond in 
pretrial testimony that it was entirely possible that he did so 
(R. 213 at 12-13). Mr. Ramirez also testified that Officer Stuck 
handcuffed him with his hands behind his back (R. 215 at 12). 
After Officer Stuck had stopped and handcuffed 
Mr. Ramirez, a second officer, Officer Robert Rackley, arrived on 
the scene (R. 211 at 6). Officer Rackley was out of his patrol 
sector, causing Officer Stuck to question why he was present in the 
area (R. 213 at 13-14). Officer Rackley informed Officer Stuck that 
a robbery had recently occurred at the Pizza Hut to the north and 
that when he heard his broadcast, he decided to assist Officer Stuck 
and investigate (R. 213 at 14-15). Officer Stuck then asked Officer 
Rackley if Mr. Ramirez fit the description (R. 213 at 15). 
Observing Mr. Ramirez to be of the general ethnic description of 
Hispanic, Officer Rackley confirmed that Mr. Ramirez fit the general 
description (R. 211 at 8; R. 213 at 15). At that point, no 
discussion occurred as to the description of either the pipe man or 
the gun man, but Mr. Ramirez was then handcuffed to the fence and 
arrangements were made to bring witnesses to this scene for 
identification purposes (R. 211 at 11; R. 213 at 16). Mr. Ramirez 
was viewed by the witnesses from the back seat of the police cars 
with the headlights of several police cars shining on him and with 
several officers standing around him (R. 213 at 52-53). Police 
officers also informed each of the witnesses that a suspect had been 
found which fit their descriptions (R. 213 at 49-51, 59, 68-69). 
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Although the record is somewhat confusing as to which 
witness arrived first for the showup and/or whether they arrived 
together, the record discloses that neither Kathy Davis nor her 
husband, John Davis, could identify Mr. Ramirez as either of the 
robbers (R. 213 at 49-50, 59, 61-62, 69). Mr. Wilson, however, did 
identify for police officers Mr. Ramirez as the man he saw holding 
the gun (R. 213 at 51). Mr. Ramirez was subsequently taken into 
custody and charged with Aggravated Robbery (R. 3). 
Pretrial motions were filed by Mr. Ramirez, moving to 
suppress the identification of him by Mr. Wilson inasmuch as the 
procedures used by the police officers were unduly suggestive 
(R. 49-50). Mr. Ramirez further moved that all evidence including 
the identification by Mr. Wilson obtained by police officers against 
Mr. Ramirez should be suppressed inasmuch as such evidence was 
obtained in violation of Mr. Ramirez's rights against unreasonable 
search and seizure as guaranteed by both the federal and state 
constitutions (R. 47-48). 
Extensive hearings were conducted on these two pretrial 
motions over several days (R. 211, 213, 215). At the conclusion of 
the testimony, Mr. Ramirez again moved to suppress the 
identification and any and all statements by Mr. Ramirez as fruits 
of an unlawful seizure as well as moving to suppress the actual 
identification testimony of Mr. Wilson itself as a product of an 
unconstitutional showup (R. 215 at 26). Both motions were denied by 
the trial court (R. 85, 87-88). 
Prior to trial, counsel renewed both motions and asked 
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for a continuing objection to any and all evidence introduced 
contrary to the suppression motion (R. 212 at 2-3). The trial court 
granted the continuing objection (R. 212 at 3). 
Prior to trial, Mr. Ramirez moved the trial court to 
limit the argument of counsel for the State to avoid any discussion 
of crime in general or prior crimes of this particular Pizza Hut 
(R. 212 at 5-8). The Court withheld ruling on the motion (R. 212 at 
8). Mr. Ramirez later objected to remarks made by the prosecutor in 
both his opening statement and his closing arguments and moved for a 
mistrial and new trial respectively (R. 212 at 18-19; R. 214). 
Transcripts of the closing argument were prepared and a hearing held 
on that motion; counsel also renewed the pretrial motions as motions 
for a new trial (R. 214). Following argument by both counsel, the 
trial court denied the motion for a new trial (R. 172-73). 
Mr. Ramirez now appeals his conviction. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Police Officer Stuck violated Mr. Ramirez's rights as 
protected by the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United 
States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution when he stopped and frisked Mr. Ramirez without a 
reasonable articulable suspicion. The evidence acquired as fruits 
of that unlawful search and seizure, including the subsequent 
identification by Gerald Wilson, must therefore be suppressed, 
requiring a reversal of the conviction and a new trial. 
Mr. Ramirez was identified by witness'Gerald Wilson 
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pursuant to suggestive police procedures which rendered the 
identification unreliable and mandates reversal of the conviction 
and a new trial. 
The prosecutor's remarks in his opening statement and 
closing arguments to the jury were inappropriate and jeopardized 
Mr. Ramirez's right to a fundamentally fair trial. The remarks 
likely altered the outcome of the jury's verdict demanding that the 
conviction be reversed and a new trial granted. 
Insufficient evidence exists to sustain Mr. Ramirez's 
conviction for armed robbery, requiring that the conviction be 
reversed and the trial court ordered to dismiss the charges against 
him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO GRANT THE MOTION TO 
SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE WHICH FOLLOWED THE UNLAWFUL 
SEIZURE OF MR. RAMIREZ. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress 
the identification and subsequent statements and evidence acquired 
against him as fruits of an unlawful seizure which violated his 
state and federal constitutional rights (R. 47-48). Extensive 
pretrial testimony was introduced over three separate hearings held 
March 18, 1988; May 12, 1988; and May 31, 1988 (R. 213, 211, and 215 
respectively). Following the testimony, arguments were presented to 
the trial court by respective counsel (R. 215 at 50-69). The trial 
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court took the motion under advisement (R. 215 at 69) but later 
denied Mr. Ramirez's motion (R. 87-88). At the start of trial, 
Mr. Ramirez renewed his motion and requested a continuing objection 
to any and all evidence introduced pursuant to the illegal seizure 
(R. 212 at 2-3). The trial court granted the continuing objection 
(R. 212 at 3). Following the trial and conviction of Mr. Ramirez, 
he filed a motion for a new trial, requesting the court to 
reconsider the motion to suppress (R. 163-64, R. 214, September 21, 
1988 hearing at 2-3). The trial court denied the new trial motion 
(R. 172-74). Mr. Ramirez now asserts that the trial court committed 
prejudicial error in failing to grant the motions and in finding the 
stop by Officer Stuck to be within constitutional strictures. 
The fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States 
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution 
mandate that a person may not be detained by law enforcement 
personnel, even momentarily, without reasonable and objective 
grounds for doing so. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1953); 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 344, 353-54 (1980). 
Otherwise, a seizure of the person occurs. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 16 (1968). Such a seizure is constitutionally justifiable only 
when an objective articulable suspicion exists that the person 
seized has committed or is about to commit a crime. Florida v. 
Royer, 460 U.S. at 498; Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 440 (1980); 
State v, Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985). 
The State argued against the motion to suppress and the 
subsequent motion for a new trial, claiming the actions of police 
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officers in this case were justified as a police-citizen encounter 
rather than as a Terry-stop. By labeling the police officers1 
actions as an encounter rather than a stop, the prosecutor avoided 
the body of law referenced above as well as the Utah Legislature's 
codification of the principles recognized in that body of law found 
at Utah Code Ann, §77-7-15 (1953 as amended)1. An examination of 
the facts of this case requires that this Court reject that argument 
and remand this case to the trial court, ordering a new trial with 
the suppression motion granted. 
At approximately 1:00 o'clock in the morning of 
August 13, 1987, Officer Stuck of the Salt Lake Police Department 
was in uniform driving his marked police cruiser on Morton Drive 
near 600 North in Salt Lake County (R. 213 at 5-6). Officer Stuck 
was driving northbound with both the headlights and the police radio 
of the police cruiser turned off and was in the process of looking 
for a female runaway (R. 213 at 6, 10). He observed two men on the 
east side of Morton Drive walking in his direction (R. 213 at 6). 
The officer indicated that when it appeared to him that the two men 
saw him, one of them ran eastbound on 600 North (R. 213 at 6). The 
second man, Mr. Ramirez, continued southbound on Morton Drive, 
crossing the intersection of 600 North to the southeast corner of 
1
 Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 as amended) states: 
77-7-15. Authority of Peace Officer to Stop and Question Suspect— 
Grounds. A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when 
he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in 
the act of committing or is attempting to commit a public offense 
and may demand his name, address and an explanation of his actions. 
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Morton Drive and 600 North (R. 213 at 8). Officer Stuck further 
indicated that when he saw the one man run away, he sped up a bit 
and then stopped Mr. Ramirez (R. 213 at 8). In the process, he 
turned on his radio and notified dispatch that a person had run from 
him and that he was investigating a pedestrian (R. 213 at 14). The 
officer testified that he then pulled up to Mr. Ramirez, got out of 
his car, approached Mr. Ramirez, and asked him for identification 
(R. 213 at 8). 
Although Officer Stuck was unaware of any burglary 
reports, car prowls or crimes of any nature in that immediate 
vicinity that night (R. 213 at 8-9), he articulated that he stopped 
Mr. Ramirez and asked him for identification because "he had been 
with another man who ran from me, and at 1:00 o'clock in the morning 
in an area that had a very high incidence of night-time residential 
burglary and car prowls" (R. 213 at 8). The officer indicated that 
Mr. Ramirez had not done anything other than his being present in 
the area at that hour which caused him to stop Mr. Ramirez (R. 213 
at 9) . 
At the suppression hearing, Mr. Ramirez testified that 
after the other individual had run, Police Officer Stuck exited his 
car and hollered at him to hold it; he testified the officer had 
his hands placed on his gun (R. 215 at 12). Mr. Ramirez 
subsequently testified that he was then frisked and handcuffed by 
Officer Stuck (R. 215 at 12-13). While Officer Stuckfs testimony at 
the pretrial hearing suggests that the frisk and the handcuffing 
occurred at a much later time than the initial moment advocated by 
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Mr. Ramirez, the totality of his testimony during the pretrial 
hearings and at trial indicates the contentions of Mr. Ramirez to be 
correct. Specifically, when Officer Stuck was asked by counsel 
whether he ordered Mr. Ramirez to hold his hands up when he first 
approached him, he answered, "I don't recall if I did. It's 
entirely possible" (R. 213 at 8-9). Further, while Officer Stuck 
testified at the pretrial hearing that he did not pat down or cuff 
Mr. Ramirez until after Officer Rackley arrived, he indicated 
unequivocally during his trial testimony that he had patted down 
Mr. Ramirez searching for identification prior to the arrival of 
Officer Rackley. Compare R. 213 at 15 with R. 212 at 156-57. 
Also noteworthy is that Officer Stuck testified at the 
pretrial hearing that Mr. Ramirez, after being stopped, was backed 
up against a fence (R. 213 at 9), where Officer Rackley, the second 
officer at the scene, later strung a second set of handcuffs through 
the initial set already on his wrists, handcuffing Mr. Ramirez to 
the fence (R. 212 at 16-17). Moreover, the testimony of Officer 
Rackley buttresses the conclusion that the stop was in violation of 
constitutional requirements and Utah statutory provisions. He 
testified that Officer Stuck had in fact intended to conduct a stop 
of Mr. Ramirez rather than a police-citizen encounter as witnessed 
by the dispatch of Officer Stuck. Officer Rackley testified that he 
had "heard Officer Stuck call out on a guy that was running, that he 
stopped somebody, was on a shakedown" (R. 211 at 6). 
While counsel and the trial judge spent considerable time 
in the pretrial motion discussing events occurring after the arrival 
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of Officer Rackley, Mr. Ramirez contends for purposes of this appeal 
that those events are irrelevant to this issue. The United States 
Supreme Court opinions of Terry v. Ohio and its progeny require that 
a "stop" and "frisk" of an individual must necessarily be justified 
at inception and in scope. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 20; 
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682. The actions of Officer 
Stuck in this case were justified neither at inception nor in 
scope. Case law, both federal and from this jurisdiction, reveals 
that the officer's behavior was devoid of any reasonable articulable 
suspicion to justify the stop of Mr. Ramirez. The United States 
Supreme Court in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979), stated that 
location alone was insufficient to justify a Terry-stop. The Court 
indicated that: "[ijn the absence of any basis for suspecting 
appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public interest and 
the appellant's right to personal security and privacy tilts in 
favor of freedom from police intervention." _I_d. That a police 
officer has a duty to investigate citizens walking in the early 
morning hours is a stretch of the role police play in our society. 
Such a duty only attaches when a reasonable basis exists for the 
officer "in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner 
[to] approach a person for purposes of investigating possible 
criminal behavior . . . " Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 22. 
The Utah Legislature has indicated in statute that the 
Utah constitutional provision against unreasonable searches and 
seizures similarly requires more of police officers before impinging 
on the privacy rights of individuals. Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 (1953 
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as amended). Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 requires that before a police 
officer stops a person in a public place, he must have a reasonable 
suspicion to believe that a crime has been committed or is about to 
be committed and this reasonable suspicion must exist prior to when 
that officer demands identification from the individual. Utah case 
law unsurprisingly agrees with that premise. 
in State v. Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985), a police 
officer stopped two men walking near the scene of a burglary. The 
officer told the men to stop and asked for identification. A backup 
officer arrived and the officers phoned in a warrants check. This 
Court considered the officer's action to be a seizure and held that 
the officers did not have a reasonable suspicion based on objective 
facts to justify the stop. 
in State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103 (Utah 1980), an 
officer approached defendants in an all-night laundromat at 
1:00 a.m. The officer asked the individuals for identification and 
what they were doing there. This Court held that "there was no 
improper seizure or detention in the questioning.11 Ic^. at 105 
(emphasis added). There was "no improper seizure" because the 
officer articulated reasonable objective facts upon which he based 
that stop. Id. 
Thus, in both Swanigan and Whittenback, this Court 
considered the stop a seizure requiring reasonable articulable 
suspicion. See, also, State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986), 
and State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 (Utah 1984). These rulings 
comport with §77-7-15 and the Legislature's statutory interpretation 
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of the Utah constitutional provision, Article I, Section 14, 
limiting the intrusion into an individual's privacy by police 
personnel. The Utah Court of Appeals has similarly ruled. See 
State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85 (Utah App. 1987). 
On the facts of the case at bar, no reasonable suspicion 
existed for Officer Stuck to stop Mr. Ramirez in the early morning 
hours of August 13, 1988. On Officer Stuck's own admission, 
Mr. Ramirez had not done anything to arouse suspicion other than be 
in that neighborhood at one ofclock in the morning (R. 213 at 9).' 
Officer Stuck was unaware of the Pizza Hut robbery, or any car 
prowls, or any burglary reports, or crimes of any nature when he 
stopped Mr. Ramirez. Yet, the officer demanded that Mr. Ramirez 
stop and then immediately requested identification from him, and he 
searched him for identification when none was proffered (R. 212 at 
156-57). Therefore, the stop of Mr. Ramirez exceeded the 
permissible behavior as outlined by §77-7-15, Utah case law, and 
federal case law in that the stop of Mr. Ramirez was not reasonable 
at its inception. 
Moreover, the stop of Mr. Ramirez was per se unreasonable 
in scope. The federal constitution and the constitution of Utah 
both mandate that in the stop and frisk situation, an officer may 
only pat down the suspect when in fear of his personal safety or 
that of others. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Sibron v. 
New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). In Sibron v. New York, the United 
States Supreme Court stated: 
The police officer is not entitled to seize and 
search every person whom he sees on the street or 
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of whom he makes inquiries. Before he places a 
hand on the person of a citizen in search of 
anything, he must have constitutionally adequate, 
reasonable grounds for doing so. In the case of 
the self-protective search for weapons, he must be 
able to point to particular facts from which he 
reasonably inferred that the individual was armed 
and dangerous. 
392 U.S. at 64. In this case, Officer Stuck indicated that he 
searched Mr. Ramirez for identification after Mr. Ramirez told him 
he had none. That frisk was in direct contravention of 
constitutional strictures and was per se unreasonable in scope. 
Because Officer Stuck was unable to articulate a 
reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of Mr. Ramirez, the stop 
was not reasonable at inception; because he searched Mr. Ramirez 
without a constitutionally valid basis, the stop was not reasonable 
in scope. It follows therefore that the federal and state 
constitutional rights of Mr. Ramirez were violated. Accordingly, 
the fruits which followed the unreasonable seizure of Mr. Ramirez 
must be suppressed in accordance with the law outlined in Terry v. 
Ohio and as required by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), and 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). 
Before proceeding to the additional issues of this appeal, 
Mr. Ramirez makes the following observations on the theory of the 
policy-citizen encounter and urges its inapplicability to the case 
at bar. In the case of State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, the concept 
of the police-citizen encounter was acknowledged by this Court. 
However, Mr. Ramirez respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider its adoption of the police-citizen encounter for several 
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reasons: First, in this state, the statutory reference found at 
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15 establishes the requirements police officers 
must meet prior to demanding identification or questioning 
individuals. The police-citizen encounter as now outlined in 
State v. Deitman ignores the statutory requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. §77-7-15. Secondly, the per curiam opinion of State v. Deitman 
is ill-founded. In Deitman, this Court cited United States v. 
Merritt, 736 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984), for the proposition that 
police-citizen encounters have been sanctioned by the United States 
Supreme Court. A brief review of the facts in Merritt, however, 
discloses that the cited language relied on in State v. Deitman is 
pure dicta. In Merritt, federal and state officials stopped a 
vessel later found to contain drugs. The government never argued 
this was a police-citizen encounter; rather, the government 
consistently and successfully argued that the investigatory stop was 
supported by an articulable suspicion that the vessel was engaged in 
drug trafficking. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that 
the stop was valid under Terry v. Ohio standards. Merritt, 736 F.2d 
at 230. The cited language was surplusage in Merritt and is 
surplusage in Deitman, and this Court should refrain from continuing 
the erroneous reliance on State v. Deitman. 
Third, and most important for this appeal, even if this 
Court refuses to retreat from the position advanced in State v. 
Deitman, the factual peculiarities existing in Deitman do not exist 
in this case, and the police-citizen encounter is therefore 
distinguishable from the occurrences therein. In State v. Deitman, 
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police officers remained in their automobile and asked the 
defendants in that case whether they would mind speaking with them. 
This Court stated: In Deitman, "defendants were not stopped by the 
officer and raised no objection when the officer asked if he could 
talk to them. They crossed the street, produced identification on 
request, and were not detained against their will." Moreover, the 
request of identification and explanation of their presence in the 
area was permissible solely because the police were investigating 
and responding to a burglary. In this case, Officer Stuck was not 
aware of any crime and he did not ask Mr. Ramirez if he would mind 
talking to him; he stopped Mr. Ramirez, approached Mr. Ramirez, and 
demanded identification. As State v. Deitman is, at a minimum, 
distinguishable from the facts in the case at bar, as well as 
State v. Swanigan and State v. Whittenback cited above, the 
police-citizen encounter theory is inappropriate to this case and 
should play no role. 
Accordingly, Mr. Ramirez requests this Court to find 
violations of his constitutional rights against unreasonable search 
and seizure and to remand his case for a new trial where the 
evidence obtained by virtue of those violations is suppressed. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PREJUDICIAL 
ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO SUPPRESS THE IDENTIFICATION 
TESTIMONY OF GERALD WILSON AS THE PRODUCT OF 
SUGGESTIVE SHOWUP PROCEDURES. 
Prior to trial, Mr. Ramirez filed a motion to suppress the 
eyewitness identification testimony of Gerald Wilson inasmuch as 
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that identification of him was the product of unconstitutional 
suggestive showup procedures (R. 49-50). Extensive pretrial 
testimony was introduced over three separate hearings held March 18, 
1988; May 12, 1988; and May 31, 1988 (R. 213, 211 and 215 
respectively). Following the testimony, arguments were presented by 
Mr. Ramirez in support of the motion to suppress (R. 215 at 26). 
The trial court denied that motion (R. 87-88). At trial, 
Mr. Ramirez requested a continuing objection to all such 
identification testimony by Gerald Wilson (R. 212 at 2-3). The 
trial court granted the continuing objection (R. 212 at 3). 
Following the trial and conviction of Mr. Ramirez, he filed a motion 
for a new trial, again asserting that the procedures utilized by 
police officers to obtain identification testimony against him were 
unnecesssarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken 
identification (R. 163-64; R. 214, September 21, 1988 hearing at 
2-3). The trial court denied the motion for a new trial 
(R. 172-74). Mr. Ramirez now urges on appeal that the trial court's 
reluctance and failure to grant his motions was contrary to 
constitutional protections afforded by state and federal due process 
requirements and that his conviction should therefore be reversed 
and a new trial ordered. 
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court authored three 
opinions examining the viability of eyewitness identification 
procedures, finding substantial concerns with those procedures and 
the resulting testimony. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 
(1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); and Stovall v. 
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Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). Several of the Court's observations 
merit attention before consideration of this case now at bar. In 
United States v. Wade, the Court noted: 
The vagaries of eyewitness identification are 
well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife 
with instances of mistaken identification. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once said: "What is the 
worth of identification testimony even when 
uncontradicted? The identification of strangers is 
proverbially untrustworthy. The hazards of such 
testimony are established by a formidable number of 
instances in the records of English and American 
trials. These instances are recent—not due to the 
brutalities of ancient criminal procedure."* A" 
major factor contributing to the high incidence of 
miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification 
has been a degree of suggestion inherent in the 
manner in which the prosecution presents the 
suspect to witnesses for pretrial identification. 
A commentator has observed that "[t]he influence of 
improper suggestion upon identifying witnesses 
probably accounts for more miscarriages of justice 
than any other single factor—perhaps it is 
responsible for more such errors than all other 
factors combined." Suggestion can be created 
intentionally or unintentionally in many subtle 
ways. And the dangers for the suspect are 
particularly grave when the witness1 opportunity 
for observation was insubstantial, and thus his 
susceptibility to suggestion the greatest. 
Moreover, "[i]t is a matter of common 
experience that, once a witness has picked out the 
accused at the line-up, he is not likely to go back 
on his word later on, so that in practice the issue 
of identity may (in the absence of other relevant 
evidence) for all practical purposes be determined 
there and then, before the trial." 
388 U.S. at 228-29 (footnotes omitted; citations omitted). Of 
particular significance to the practice employed by the officers in 
this case—the one-person showup—the Court has commented that: 
[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to 
persons for the purpose of identification, and not 
part of a lineup, has been widely condemned. 
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Stovall v, Denno, 388 U.S. at 303. 
Since this trilogy of United States Supreme Court cases, 
this Court has yet to address a single-person showup procedure and 
rule on the acceptability of that process. This Court, however, has 
authored opinions addressing problems of similar suggestive 
practices. In State v. Perry, 492 P.2d 1349, 1352 (Utah 1972), this 
Court stated: 
[T]he circumstances of the individual case should 
be scrutinized carefully by the trial court to see 
whether the identification procedures there was 
anything done which should be regarded as so 
suggestive or persuasive that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that the identification was not a 
genuine product of the knowledge and recollection 
of the witness but was something so distorted or 
tainted that in fairness and justness the guilt or 
innocence of an accused should not be allowed to be 
tested thereby. 
Later that same year, the United States Supreme Court advanced five 
factors for trial courts to apply in considering such issues. In 
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972), the Court reaffirmed the 
Stovall v. Denno "totality of the circumstances" standard to 
determine the reliability of suggestive identification procedures 
under due process challenges. The Court announced the five factors 
for consideration as (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the 
criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness1 degree of 
attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness1 prior description of the 
criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at 
the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and 
the confrontation. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199. 
Following Neil v. Biggers, this Court adopted the 
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five-factor analysis. See State v. Newton, 657 P.2d 759 (Utah 
1983); State v. Tucker, 657 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982); State v. 
Wulffenstein, 657 P.2d 289 (Utah 1982); and State v. Malmrose, 649 
P.2d 56 (Utah 1982). More recently, however, this Court has 
criticized the five factors announced in Neil v. Biggers as outdated 
noting, n[S]everal of the criteria listed by the Court are based on 
assumptions that are flatly contradicted by well-respected and 
essentially unchallenged empirical studies." State v. Long, 721 
P.2d 483, 491 (Utah 1986). Critical for this appeal, the Long Court 
notably singled out the "level of certainty" factor in Neil v. 
Biggers stating: 
Research has also undermined the common notion that 
the confidence with which an individual makes an 
identification is a valid indicator of the accuracy 
of the recollection. In fact, the accuracy of an 
identification is, at times, inversely related to 
the confidence with which it is made. 
721 P.2d at 490 (citations omitted). In suggesting valid 
considerations for determining the accuracy of eyewitness testimony, 
this Court replaced the dated "level of certainty" factor with the 
consideration of "whether the witness1 identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was 
the product of suggestion." 721 P.2d at 483. 
The opinion authored by this Court in State v. Long 
notably coincides with the earlier pre-Neil v. Biggers opinion of 
State v. Perry where the Utah Supreme Court's focus was more 
squarely placed on an examination of the suggestiveness of the 
procedures utilized to obtain the eyewitness testimony. See 
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State v. Perry, 492 P.2d at 1352. Mr. Ramirez accordingly urges 
that this Court retreat from the use of the five factors announced 
in Neil v. Biggers and employ the more current considerations 
approved by this Court in State v. Long consistent with the prior 
premise of State v. Perry. Alternatively, Mr. Ramirez urges that, 
at a minimum, this Court should include the recently recognized 
factors in the examination of the totality of the circumstances. 
Therefore, for purposes of this appeal, Mr. Ramirez will brief all 
relevant considerations, urging that the circumstances under the 
dated Neil v. Biggers test, with or without the more current 
State v. Long examination, require that his conviction be reversed. 
A reiteration of the facts discloses that the factors 
balance in favor of Mr. Ramirez. Although the entire robbery took 
about ten minutes, Mr. Wilson testified that he didn't even know the 
gunman was present until after the point that the man with the pipe 
had struck him in the stomach (R. 213 at 44-45). Only when 
Mr. Wilson attempted to again take the pipe from the first robber 
and the first robber spoke to the gunman did Mr. Wilson realize a 
second robber was present (R. 213 at 44). On cross-examination of 
Mr. Wilson, defense counsel queried: 
Q: You think the whole robbery took about ten 
minutes? 
A: Yes. 
Q: And so out of that time was it maybe one-half 
of that time or less that you saw the one with the 
gun that you were aware of? 
A: It was only about a minute I seen the guy with 
the gun. Just a matter of seconds I saw the guy. 
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(R. 213 at 45). Following the robbery, police officers arrived 
within ten minutes and took statements from the three victims 
(R. 213 at 45). Mrs. Davis, like her brother, was unaware of the 
presence of the gunman until the man with the pipe had directed the 
attention to him (R. 213 at 65). While she testified that the 
lighting in the area was generally bright, she indicated that the 
man with the gun was standing in a shadowy area (R. 212 at 58). She 
was therefore unable to give a description of the gunman (R. 213 at 
65). Mr. Davis testified that he didn't really see the gunman, 
primarily because the man with the gun was standing back in a 
shadowy area (R. 213 at 70, R. 212 at 63). He later stated that he 
could not get a good look at the individual and could only see a 
vague image oE the person with the gun (R. 212 at 74). However, 
Mr. Davis did give a description of the gunman, who he described as 
eighteen or nineteen years old, five feet six inches tall, slender, 
brown eyes, wearing Levis, and with a white bandana over his face. 
He also indicated that the robber with the gun had a red and white 
cap and was holding a gun (R. 215 at 6). 
Mr. Wilson testified that the area was well lit, though 
without direct lighting and that he viewed the man with the gun for 
somewhere between a matter of seconds and a minute with no one in 
between them (R. 213 at 43, 45). Later at trial, he contradicted 
his own testimony when he indicated that the man with the pipe was 
actually standing between him and the man with the gun (R. 212 at 
44). Mr. Wilson gave descriptions of both robbers to the police 
officers within minutes of their arrival. To Officer Travis, 
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Mr, Wilson gave the description of the man with the pipe as a male 
Mexican, between twenty-one and twenty-two years old, five feet 
seven to five feet eight, 155 to 160 pounds, shaggy brown hair, 
brown eyes, blue sweater and Levis. He was also wearing a white 
scarf. Mr. Wilson also testified that the man with the pipe had one 
front tooth missing and a bald spot on one side of his head (R. 215 
at 6-7). Regarding the gunman, Mr. Wilson testified that he also 
was a male Mexican, five feet nine inches to six feet tall, was 
wearing a blue sweater and Levis, with a white scarf across his 
face, and holding a revolver (R. 215 at 7). 
Moments later, witnesses were alerted by the police 
officers that a suspect had been located several blocks away and 
that the police would take the witnesses to that location to 
identify the suspect (R. 213 at 15-16). The record reveals some 
confusion as to which witness veiwed Mr. Ramirez first and whether 
witnesses viewed Mr. Ramirez together (R. 213 at 49-50, 59, 61-62, 
69). The record is quite clear, however, that the police officers 
told the witnesses that they had a suspect that fit the description 
(R. 213 at 49-51, 59, 68-69). When pressed by defense counsel for a 
more accurate recollection of the comments by the police officer, 
Mr. Wilson stated: "The police officer told me 'I've found a man 
that fit one of the descriptions. Can you come and identify him?'" 
Mr. Wilson responded: "Yes, I can. I'll come with you" (R. 213 at 
50). On arrival to the spot where Mr. Ramirez was being held, the 
police officer asked Mr. Wilson: "Is this one of the men that did 
it?" Mr. Wilson said: "That was the man with the gun" (R. 213 at 
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51). Mr. Ramirez was viewed by Mr. Wilson, who sat in the back seat 
of the police car, while Mr. Ramirez was handcuffed behind his back 
and handcuffed to a fence with several police officers standing 
around him; headlights of the police cars were used to supply the 
light for the identification (R. 213 at 51-53). 
Both other victims were also taken by police officers to 
view Mr. Ramirez, though, as indicated above, neither of these 
witnesses claimed to have obtained a good enough description of the 
defendant to identify him because of his presence in a shadowy 
area. Neither victim identified Mr. Ramirez as either of the 
robbers. Mr. Davis recalls the police officer saying: "We have a 
suspect that we think is the one that did it." Despite that 
suggestive introduction and despite Mr. Davis1 prior description of 
the gunman, he could not identify Mr. Ramirez as the robber with the 
gun. 
The above recitation of the facts indicates that, under an 
examination of the totality of the circumstances, Mr. Wilson's 
identification of Livio Ramirez was suspect and gives rise to a 
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification. See 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 at 384. In particular, the 
evidence above indicates that Mr. Wilson's opportunity to view 
Mr. Ramirez was quite limited. By his own testimony, it was only a 
matter of seconds to a minute that he saw the man with the gun. At 
one point, he indicated there was no one in his view, but he later 
testified that the pipe man was between him and the gunman. While 
conceding that Mr. Wilson's degree of attention must have been 
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heightened during this very short time frame, the facts also 
disclose that, once alerted to the presence of the gunman, the pipe 
man again swung at Mr. Wilson, missing him only because the pipe 
struck the rain gutter above his head. These facts indicate that 
Mr. Wilson's degree of attention over those few seconds was divided 
among the gunman, the pipe man, and his concern for his sister, who 
was being pushed and ordered to reenter the Pizza Hut to obtain the 
day's receipts. 
Examining the accuracy of Mr. Wilson's prior description 
of the gunman reveals that the original description was incredibly 
generic. This is especially visible when contrasting this 
description of the gunman Mr. Wilson gave Police Officer Travis with 
the description he gave her regarding the suspect with the pipe. 
Regarding the man with the pipe, Mr. Wilson offered details such as 
one front tooth was missing, a bald spot on the side of his head, 
brown eyes, shaggy brown hair, weight, etc. Regarding the man with 
the gun, Mr. Wilson's description was limited to male Mexican, blue 
sweater and Levis, white scarf across the face. 
Further revealing the inaccuracy of Mr. Wilson's prior 
description is the testimony he offered later at the pretrial 
hearing on the motion to suppress and then again at the trial. The 
testimony offered at those hearings was much more detailed the 
description given mere moments after the event when questioned by 
Police Officer Travis. Notably, the presence of detail in 
Mr. Wilson's description of the gunman was forthcoming only after he 
was taken by police officers to see Mr. Ramirez handcuffed to the 
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fence surrounded by police officers and after seeing Mr. Ramirez in 
the courtroom setting of a preliminary hearing. Only then was 
Mr. Wilson able to give such persuasive details such as a 
tattoo—which is as significant for visual sighting as is a bald 
spot on the side of the head or a missing front tooth—and the 
particular description of the long hair and the particular nature of 
the eyes. 
The improved detail of identification testimony is 
probably best explained by reiterating a comment by the United 
States Supreme Court in United States v. Wade. There the Court 
noted: 
It is a matter of common experience that, 
once a witness has picked out the accused at the 
[showup], he is not likely to go back on his word 
later on, so that in practice the issue of identity 
may (in the absence of other relevant evidence) for 
all practical purposes be determined there and 
then, before the trial. 
388 U.S. at 229 (citation omitted). Additionally, this Court has 
also recognized common human frailties which render suspect 
Mr. Wilson's recollection of more and more details as the criminal 
process progressed. This Court offered the explanation: 
Another mechanism we all develop to compensate for 
our inability to receive all aspects of an event at 
once is a series of logical inferences: if we see 
one thing, we assume, based on our past experience, 
that we also saw another that ordinarily follows. 
This way we can "perceive" a whole event in our 
mind's eye when we have actually seen or heard only 
portions of it. 
State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 489 (citation omitted). This Court 
compared this problem of compensating through logical inferences 
- 28 -
with the similar problems of selective perception and perceiving 
through expectations, prejudices and biases. J^ d. All of these 
concerns offer explanations for Mr. Wilson's improved 
identifications and also offer reasons for this Court to reject as 
inherently unreliable the accuracy of Mr. Wilson's identification of 
Mr. Ramirez as the gunman in the Pizza Hut robbery. 
Mr. Wilson admittedly appeared throughout the 
identification process to be very certain that Mr. Ramirez was the 
man with the gun. As indicated above, his level of certainty 
increased at each identification hearing. This Court in State v. 
Long recognized that the level of certainty or confidence with which 
an individual makes an identification is often inversely related to 
the accuracy of the recollection and identification. Moreover, the 
Long Court cited numerous empirical studies which recognize the 
human frailties with eyewitness identification, suggesting that many 
times witnesses fill in facts and details to complete their prior 
identification. The testimony of Mr. Wilson throughout this case is 
a text book example of an individual who honestly wants to do the 
right thing to protect his sister and to defend his original 
identification while doing his duty to society as well. 
The length of time between the crime and the confrontation 
is always a critical factor in the Neil v. Biggers analysis. In 
this case, the length of time between the actual robbery and the 
presentation of Mr. Ramirez to the witnesses was within an hour. 
However, this factor, like those above, is not dispositive of the 
issue and, when balanced with the other factors, offers little 
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support that Mr. Wilson's identification testimony is credible. 
Again, Mr. Ramirez notes that most of the detail of Mr. Wilson's 
in-court testimony regarding the description of the gunman was 
obtained after this initial confrontation, and Mr. Ramirez urges 
this Court to focus on the initial description of Mr. Wilson given 
moments after the event and the physical characteristics of 
Mr. Ramirez himself to negate the short time period which passed 
between the actual crime and this initial confrontation. 
In State v. Long, this Court criticized several of the 
factors discussed above, indicating that in particular the level of 
certainty factor enunciated in Neil v. Biggers is of little utility 
and should be replaced with considerations of whether the witness 
identification was spontaneous and consistent or whether it was a 
product of suggestion. Examining the consistency and/or suggestive 
nature of the confrontation discloses that it is highly questionable 
whether Mr. Wilson's in-court testimony was a product of the 
observations at the scene of the robbery. Rather, the facts 
strongly suggest the identification of Mr. Ramirez was a product of 
the methods employed by police officers to obtain that 
identification testimony, to wit: the one-person showup moments 
after the robbery encouraged by suggestive questioning and 
suggestive presentation. 
Case law supports that what occurred in this case reduces 
the trustworthiness of the subsequent in-court testimony. The 
United States Supreme Court stated in Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 
293, 303 (1967), that "[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to 
- 30 -
persons for the purpose of identification and not part of a lineup, 
has been widely condemned." The rationale for this judicial 
condemnation has been admirably expressed in an analogous situation, 
a one-person photo showup, by the United States Supreme Court in 
Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968), where the Court 
stated: 
This danger [that the witness will make an 
incorrect identification] will be increased if the 
police display to the witness only the picture of a 
single individual who generally resembles the 
person he saw, or if they show him the pictures of 
several persons among which the photograph of a 
single such individual recurs or is someway 
emphasized. The chance of misidentification is 
also heightened if the police indicate to the 
witness that they have other evidence that one of 
the persons pictured committed the crime. 
Regardless of how the initial misidentification 
comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to 
retain in his memory the image of the photograph 
rather than of the person actually seen, reducing 
the trustworthiness of the subsequent lineup or 
courtroom identification. 
Id. at 383-84. The police officers in this case accompanied 
Mr. Wilson, either alone or with his sister, to the location where 
police offices were holding Mr. Ramirez. Enroute to the location, 
police officers informed Mr. Wilson they had a suspect that fit his 
earlier description. Mr. Wilson recalls the officer's statement as 
"I found a man that fit one of the descriptions. Can you come and 
identify him?n Arriving at the location, the police officer 
reiterated: "is this one of the men that did it?" Supporting the 
suggestiveness of that confrontational showup was that Mr. Ramirez 
was not in the course of a normal routine but was presented as a 
criminal inasmuch" as he was handcuffed behind his back and then to a 
- 31 -
fence and was guarded by police officers. Such a presentation to a 
witness is impermissibly suggestive and in violation of 
constitutional due process strictures. 
The United States Supreme Court's observation in United 
States v. Wade is applicable to this case. 
The influence of improper suggestion upon 
identifying the witness probably accounts for more 
miscarriages of justice than any other single 
factor—perhaps it is responsible for more such 
errors than all other factors combined." 
388 U.S. at 228. Mr. Ramirez urges this Court -to find the 
eyewitness identification of Mr. Gerald Wilson to be 
unconstitutionally unreliable, requiring that his conviction be 
reversed and his case remanded for a new trial. 
POINT III. THE MISCONDUCT OF THE PROSECUTOR 
PREJUDICED MR. 
CONSTITUTIONAL 
REQUIRING 
RAMIREZ AND DENIED HIM 
RIGHT TO A 
REVERSAL OF HIS 
FAIR TRIAL, 
CONVICTION. 
HIS 
THEREBY 
Both the state and federal constitutions guarantee 
Mr. Ramirez, as they do any accused, the fundamental right to a fair 
trial. Fourteenth Amendment, United States Constitution; Article I, 
Sections 7 and 12, Utah Constitution. Prosecutors have as much of a 
duty to ensure the defendant receives a fair trial as they do to win 
cases. This Court has noted: 
We have previously stated that the State 
while charged with vigorously enforcing the laws 
has a duty to not only secure appropriate 
convictions, but an even higher duty to see that 
justice is done. In his role as the Statefs 
representative in criminal matters the prosecutor, 
therefore, must not only attempt to win cases, but 
must see that justice is done. Thus, while he 
should prosecute with earnestness and vigor, it is 
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as much his duty to refrain from improper methods 
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it 
is to use every legitimate means to bring about a 
just one. 
Walker v. State, 624 P.2d 687, 691 (Utah 1981) (quotations and 
citations omitted); accord Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 
(1935). In this case, the prosecutor violated the above tenets in 
both his opening statement and his closing arguments to the jury, 
and Mr. Ramirez therefore urges that the resulting conviction must 
be reversed. 
At the beginning of trial, Mr. Ramirez moved the trial 
court to limit certain testimony which had revealed itself during 
the pretrial hearings that would be inappropriate for the jury to 
hear at a trial phase. In particular, Mr. Ramirez moved that all 
discussion designating the area of Mr. Ramirez's arrest as a high 
crime area be kept from reaching the jury inasmuch as it is 
subjective in nature, not relevant to the issues, and prejudicial to 
Mr. Ramirez (R. 212 at 5-6). Similarly, Mr. Ramirez urged that 
testimony regarding the fact that this particular Pizza Hut had been 
robbed four times over a two-month period manifested a visible 
problem in the community with crime and also should not reach the 
jury (R. 212 at 7). This information was prejudicial to Mr. Ramirez 
inasmuch as an inference could be made that he and the alleged 
co-conspirator might be responsible for more than just this robbery 
(R. 212 at 5-8). The prosecutor responded to both concerns of 
Mr. Ramirez, indicating he had no intention of bringing up the 
matters (R. 212 at 6, 8). Based on the argument of counsel and the 
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proffers by the prosecutor, the court left open the decision whether 
to suppress this material allowing it to be dealt with as it arose 
during the course of trial (R. 212 at 8). 
The above concern articulated pretrial by Mr. Ramirez 
revealed itself during closing arguments of counsel when the 
prosecutor argued: 
Wouldn't it be nice if on all Pizza Huts and 
all other institutions there would be a camera 
mounted out there in a parking lot that could view 
everything; and then we could come to court and we 
could play back that camera video and see what 
happened . . . 
Perhaps you could see, as Livio Ramirez held 
that gun directly at Jerry Wilson, ten feet away 
for about one minute and then maybe we could begin 
to appreciate and we could begin to understand and 
we could begin to realize, the reality of the 
crime. What it meant to be a victim of a violent 
crime. Maybe we could begin to appreciate the 
fright, the pain and the loss, and the humiliation 
that went along with being a victim of a crime. 
But of course, we donft have cameras like that. 
But you know that doesn't stop us from 
apprehending and prosecuting people who commit 
such crimes. Just doesn't stop us. All across 
America today there are juries just like this with 
jurors just like you who have to make decisions, 
not based upon cameras, but based upon the 
testimony of witnesses, people who are actually 
there, people who saw it with their own eyes, 
people who experienced it and who come in under 
oath and testify as to what happened. 
I think here, we even got from the testimony, 
a little bit of appreciation of what went on; a 
little bit of appreciation of what it feels like 
when you're a victim of the crime. Remember when 
Kathy Davis testified and talked about that about 
what went on? Remember her voice begin to crack? 
Remember those tears that came to her eye as she 
was reliving the fright, and the danger and the 
pain and the violation of her safety? (R. 216 at 
4-6) . 
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In closing, the prosecutor commented to the jury: 
The judge told you that how we choose juries is 
kind of an awkward situation. Mainly, you're not 
chosen, but you're kind of what is left over. 
Hate to tell you that, but that's where you are, 
I think we got some good people. If I had the 
chance to just go out and pick the jury, I want 
you and you. I tell you what I would look for. I. 
would really look for people who live in my 
community and who are concerned about what goes 
on; concerned about the crime in this community 
and concerned about the court system and would 
like to be involved. I hope you are those kind of 
people, because you know, I can come here the 
judge can come here the defense attorney could 
come here, and all the witnesses could come and do 
our job. But in the final sentence what you do, 
determines the success of this particular case 
(R. 216 at 19-20) (emphasis added). 
While counsel did not contemporaneously object to these, and other, 
comments of the prosecutor during closing argument, Mr. Ramirez did 
file a motion for a new trial based in part on improper closing 
argument of the prosecutor, alleging inter alia that these comments 
cited above purposefully incited the jury to react to the high crime 
rate experienced in this and other communities across the nation, 
urging them to react emotionally in responding to their duties as 
jurors and to advocate the responsibility they hold to try this 
particular case on the evidence alone, free from emotion and caprice. 
It has been a long-standing precept of Anglo-American 
jurisprudence that prosecutors not employ arguments calculated to 
inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury, nor divert the jury 
from its duty to decide the case on anything other than the evidence 
before them. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935); see, 
also, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(c and d), 3-6.1(3) 
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(2d ed 1980; cf. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 3.4(e); 
and Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 7-106(c)(7). The 
prosecution's remarks outlined above violated this long-standing 
precept and prejudiced Mr. Ramirezfs rights to a fair trial. 
The other significant closing argument by the prosecutor 
attacked by Mr. Ramirez on the motion for a new trial is that the 
prosecutor made the following comment regarding the burden of proof 
to be entertained by the jurors. Quoting that last sentence of the 
instruction in question, he argued: 
"A reasonable doubt must be a real substantial 
doubt and not one that's merely possible or 
imaginary." 
From that, I want to say two things. First of 
all, the burden of proof is not beyond any doubt. 
If it was beyond any doubt, we couldn't ever prove 
anything could we. Just beyond a reasonable 
doubt. And as you read the last sentence, before 
you as a jury could come back with a not guilty 
verdict, you would have to find a reasonable 
doubt, based upon the evidence or lack thereof and 
not just a doubt that's possible or imaginary 
(R. 216 at 3) (emphasis added). 
Counsel argued that this characterization of the burden of proof 
standard urged by the prosecutor was in error and, while perhaps 
semantically correct, realistically shifted the burden from the 
State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
to the defendant, Mr. Ramirez, to prove that a reasonable doubt 
existed before the jury could return with a not guilty verdict. In 
short, the urgings by the prosecutor regarding the burden of proof 
negated the long-standing recognition of the presumption of 
innocence of every defendant including Mr. Ramirez, thereby 
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jeopardizing his constitutionally protected rights to a fair trial. 
See, e.g., Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 
397 U.S. 258 (1970). 
Mr. Ramirez urges that one other significant comment by 
the prosecutor in this case prejudiced his right to a fair trial. 
This error occurred in the opening statements of the prosecutor and 
did draw a contemporaneous objection and subsequent motion for a new 
trial. During the opening statement of the prosecutor, he advanced 
the position that Mr. Ramirez had given an address of his uncle, 
claiming to have been there earlier that evening and that the 
officers checked with that uncle, finding that he had lied about 
that visit. The prosecutor stated that, at that point, Mr. Ramirez 
changed his story to something altogether different. At the 
conclusion of the argument, counsel for Mr. Ramirez approached the 
bench and objected to the comments during an off-the-record 
discussion (R. 212 at 18-19). 
Later in the day in the absence of the jury, Mr. Ramirez 
renewed that objection taken at side bar and moved for a mistrial, 
arguing that this particular statement or discussion had been dealt 
with during the pretrial motions to suppress wherein the trial court 
had ruled that such statements of the uncle were hearsay and 
inadmissible (R. 212 at 79-80; R. 213 at 25-35). Moreover, counsel 
pointed out that the prosecution had failed to list this particular 
uncle as a witness and therefore would be unable to present that 
testimony at this trial. Counsel further indicated that the 
assertions of the prosecutor were in dispute and, without the 
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testimony of the uncle, clearly left with the jurors with the 
impression that Mr. Ramirez had lied about his whereabouts, thereby 
reducing his credibility in front of the jury prior to the taking of 
any evidence and subjecting him to the inference of commiting this 
particular crime (R. 212 at 79-80). 
Counsel requested that this motion for a mistrial be 
considered as a continuing motion for a mistrial inasmuch as the 
prosecution would be unable to produce that evidence at trial. The 
trial court, however, denied counsel's motion for a mistrial without 
prejudice inasmuch as the statements were made during opening 
argument and the jury had been admonished that statements and 
arguments of counsel were not to be considered as evidence. The 
trial court did allow Mr. Ramirez the right to renew the motion for 
a mistrial at a later date (R. 212 at 80-81). Mr. Ramirez urges the 
trial court's ruling on this particular motion was in error, 
demanding that the resulting conviction be reversed. Case law 
supports this position. 
This Court has indicated: 
The purpose of an opening statement is to advise 
the jury of the facts relied upon and of the 
questions and issues involved, which the jury will 
have to determine, and to give them a general 
picture of the facts and the situations, so that 
they will be able to understand the evidence. 
Counsel should outline generally what he intends 
to prove, and should be allowed considerable 
latitute. He should make a fair statement of the 
evidence and the extent to which he may go is 
largely in the discretion of the trial court. He 
should not make a statement of any facts which he 
cannot legally prove upon the trial; nor should he 
argue the merits of his case, or relate the 
testimony at length. 
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State v, Erwin, 120 P.2d 285, 313 (Utah 1941) (citations omitted) 
(emphasis added); accord United States v. Signer, 482 F.2d 394, 
398-99 (6th Cir. 1973), and cases cited therein. In this case, the 
prosecutor's comment regarding the alleged uncle provided to the 
jury information the prosecutor could not and should not otherwise 
have presented at trial. That information was damaging inasmuch as 
jurors now possessed information regarding alleged inconsistent 
statements offered by the defendant for his whereabouts on that 
evening. Again, this information should not have been admissible 
and prejudiced Mr. Ramirez. 
In State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah 1984), this Court 
reiterated the standard governing the reversal of convictions for 
improper statements of the prosecutor. The Court stated: 
The test of whether the remarks made by counsel 
are so objectionable as to merit reversal in a 
criminal case is [1] that the remarks called to 
the attention of the jurors matters which they 
would not be justified in considering in 
determining their verdict, and [2] were they, 
under the circumstances of the particular case, 
probably influenced by those remarks. 
Id. at 486 (citing, inter alia, State v. Valdez, 513 P.2d 422, 426 
(Utah 1973). Applying this test to Mr. Ramirez's case demonstrates 
the prosecutor's misconduct in his opening statement and closing 
arguments merits reversal. 
The first prong of the test is met because the 
prosecutor's statements called to the attention of jurors matters 
which they were not entitled to consider. Particularly the comments 
in closing argument urging the jurors to emotionalize their verdict 
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are contrary to the law in general and the specific instructions 
given in this case (R. 133, 138, 148, 155). The comment regarding 
the shift in the burden of proof also jeopardizes the reliability of 
the conviction inasmuch as jurors are to be instructed by the trial 
court, not counsel. Finally, the prosecutor's comments during the 
opening statement presented the jurors with information of which 
they should not have been privy. Therefore, prong one of the 
Valdez-Troy standard is established: The remarks of the prosecutor 
in both opening statement and closing argument did call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which they were not justified in 
considering in determining their verdict in this particular case. 
The second prong is equally met in this case. The 
overall evidence against Mr. Ramirez was very weak. See Point IV, 
infra. The most critical evidence against him was the suspect 
testimony of Mr. Wilson. See Point II, supra. Therefore, the above 
comments of the prosecutor during opening statement and closing 
arguments under the circumstances of this particular case did likely 
influence the jurors in their ultimate outcome, tipping the balance 
in an otherwise tight case in favor of conviction. The jurors were 
moved emotionally by the prosecutor in closing arguments urging them 
to place themselves in the position of victims, thereby removing 
them from their neutral duty as jurors. The prosecutor's 
restatement of the burden of proof standard also likely influenced 
the jurors inasmuch as their outlook was then capable of being 
altered to one of "before we can find the defendant not guilty, we 
must find reasonable doubt" rather than the requisite "before we can 
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find the defendant guilty, we must find that the State proved all 
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Finally, the presentation by the prosecutor of 
inconsistent statements by Mr. Ramirez implying he lied to police 
officers also likely influenced the jurors to, at a minimum, 
discredit his testimony, thereby giving more weight to the witnesses 
against him. Inasmuch as both prongs of the standard governing 
reversals for improper statements of the prosecutor has been met, 
Mr. Ramirez urges this Court to find the remarks of the prosecutor 
to be misconduct, meriting reversal of his conviction. Therefore, 
this Court should remand this case for a new trial. 
POINT IV. THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION OF 
MR. RAMIREZ. 
Mr. Ramirez maintains that the evidence adduced at trial 
is unable to support the conviction of Aggravated Robbery. He 
requests this Court to examine the sufficiency of the evidence, 
reverse his conviction, and remand his case to the trial court with 
an order dismissing the charge against him. 
In State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), this 
Court stated, " [ Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the 
jury's decision, this court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." Further, the 
Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
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reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted. 
Id. This standard restates the due process requirement which 
prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except upon proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime 
with which the defendant is charged. Jackson v. Virginia/ 443 U.S. 
307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 258 (1970). Mr. Ramirez denied 
committing the aggravated robbery in this case, thereby requiring 
the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each and every element 
of that crime. While evidence existed to support that a robbery of 
the Pizza Hut had occurred, insufficient evidence existed as to the 
identification of the perpetrators of that crime. 
The critical issue in this case was indisputably one of 
identification. Even the prosecutor conceded that the ultimate, 
issue in this case was whether Mr. Ramirez was the man with the gun 
(R. 212 at 18-19; R. 216 at 3-4). Despite that concession, the 
State was unable to produce a sufficient quantum of evidence to 
identify Mr. Ramirez as the individual who committed the crime. 
Moreover, the State failed to connect Mr. Ramirez in any way with 
any physical evidence which could attach him to the crime. 
The most critical evidence introduced at trial against 
Mr. Ramirez was the testimony of Gerald Wilson, who testified that 
Mr. Ramirez was the individual who had pointed the gun at him. The 
testimony of Mr. Wilson, however, is inherently suspect due to the 
suggestive nature employed by police officers during the showup 
procedures (see Point II, supra) as well as the testimony itself 
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when compared against governing case law in this jurisdiction. In 
particular, this Court has recognized various evils inherent in 
eyewitness identification which require rejecting as unreliable the 
testimony of Mr. Wilson. In State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 489-91 
(Utah 1986), this Court outlined numerous problems both potential 
and real with the human memory process and with the ability of 
witnesses to accurately recall events. This Court pointed out that: 
[r]esearch has also undermined the common notion 
that the confidence with which an individual makes 
an identification is a valid indicator of the 
accuracy of the recollection. In fact, the 
accuracy of an identification is at times 
inversely related to the confidence with which it 
is made. 
721 P.2d at 490 (citations omitted). This recognition by this Court 
directly applies to the testimony of Mr. Wilson. The certainty of 
his identification of Mr. Ramirez as the Pizza Hut gunman is 
contrary to the majority of the indicators analyzed by the Court in 
State v. Long. Further, the factual peculiarities of this case 
discount the accuracy of Mr. Wilson's testimony in any event. 
Of the three victims involved in this case, only 
Mr. Wilson was able to identify Mr. Ramirez as the gunman. The 
State urged at trial that Mr. Wilson was the only individual that 
had a clear view of the gunman inasmuch as he studied the gunman for 
nearly one minute while the gunman pointed his weapon at 
Mr. Wilson. However, Mr. Wilson was occupied during that time as he 
was defending at least two blows from the man with the pipe and was 
also concerned for his sister being forced to re-enter the Pizza 
Hut. Further, the other two witnesses, Kathy Davis and her husband, 
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John Davis, testified that the view of the gunman was difficult at 
best. Both witnesses testified that despite good lighting in the 
parking lot of the Pizza Hut, the gunman was actually in the shadows 
near the corner of the building. The descriptions given by all 
three witnesses support this characterization of the facts by Mr. 
and Mrs. Davis inasmuch as the descriptions of the gunman were 
generic at best. 
Two descriptions of the gunman were provided to Officer 
Travis immediately after the robbery. Mr. Davis testified that the 
second suspect was from eighteen to nineteen years old, five feet 
six inches tall, slender, brown eyes, Levis, white bandana over his 
face, and wearing a red and white cap. Mr. Wilson described the man 
with the gun as a male Mexican, five feet nine inches to six feet 
tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levis, and with a white scarf 
across his face. 
Mr. Ramirez is five feet ten inches tall. He weighs one 
hundred sixty pounds. He is an Apache Indian with some Spanish 
heritage and he wears his hair shoulder length due to his Indian 
religion. He has worn his hair the same for five years. He has 
three tattoos on his arm—a rose, an "L" and a little drummer 
boy—which are all visible when wearing his sleeveless sweatshirt. 
On August 13, 1987, Mr. Ramirez was wearing Levis and a dark blue 
sweatshirt with cut-off sleeves with paint splattered all over the 
front of it. He was also wearing a brown baseball cap. 
As Mr. Wilson proceeded through the criminal process, his 
testimony became more accurate and more assured that Mr. Ramirez was 
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the gunman in this case. That occurrence parallels the analysis of 
this Court discussing the inherent danger of eyewitness testimony. 
It is noteworthy that Mr. Wilson, though claiming to see the gunman 
for between seconds and nearly one minute, did not indicate three 
peculiarities of Mr. Ramirez readily discernable. First, Mr. Wilson 
made no comment of the tattoos on Mr. Ramirez's upper arm until his 
testimony presented at trial. Second, Mr. Wilson made no 
observation that the sweat shirt (originally described by him as a 
sweater) of Mr. Ramirez was covered across the front with large 
spots of paint. Third, Mr. Wilson made no observation of the 
shoulder-length hair of the gunman which also would have been 
readily discernable. Contrasting the description of the gunman 
originally given by Mr. Wilson with his more precise and detailed 
description of the man with the pipe, to wit: one front tooth 
missing and bald spot on side of head, further suggests Mr. Wilson's 
testimony identifying Mr. Ramirez as the gunman is inaccurte and 
unreliable. 
Also important to note is that Mr. Wilson's testimony 
only became more sure and more detailed after the repeated and 
extended observations of Mr. Ramirez during the criminal justice 
process itself, the showup, the preliminary hearing, and ultimately 
the trial. Accordingly, Mr. Wilson's identification testimony, when 
checked against this Court's opinion in State v. Long which 
recognized the inherent problems in eyewitness testimony, is suspect 
and should have been discredited by the jury and, on review, must be 
rejected by this Court. As acknowledged in State v. Long, empirical 
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evidence documents the unreliability of eyewitness testimony with 
countless studies "all leadfing] inexoribly to the conclusion that 
human perception is inexact and that human memory is both limited 
and fallible." Ij3. at 488. An additional observation by this Court 
supports the need for this Court to reject the testimony of 
Mr. Wilson where the jurors did not. 
[P]erhaps it is precisely because jurors do not 
appreciate the fallibility of eyewitness testimony 
that they give such testimony great weight. In 
one notable study involving a simulated trial, 18% 
of the jurors voted to convict the defendant when 
there were no eyewitnesses to the crime. However, 
when a credible eyewitness was presented, 72% 
voted to convict. And surprisingly even when 
presented with an eyewitness who was quite 
thoroughly discredited by counsel, a full 68% 
still voted to convict. 
Id. at 490 (citations omitted). 
Understanding the suspect nature of Mr. Wilson's 
testimony and the inherent problems of eyewitness testimony in 
general, this Court must recognize that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that Mr. Ramirez was correctly 
identified as the gunman of the armed robbery of the Redwood Road 
Pizza Hut. Moreover, when contrasting the weaknesses in the 
identification of Mr. Wilson with the suggestive nature utilized in 
obtaining that testimony (see Point II, supra), this Court should 
recognize as a matter of law that the identification testimony of 
Mr. Wilson is unable and insufficient to sustain the conviction of 
Mr. Ramirez. This Court should therefore reverse the conviction for 
insufficiency of the evidence and remand the case with an order to 
dismiss the charge against him. 
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CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Ramirez 
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction of 
Armed Robbery and order that the trial court either dismiss the 
charges against him or grant a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted this c^f>JJ day of April, 1989. 
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..JUST RUN N/B < 
! WHITE BANDANAS 
! 1ST S 
! II-PO 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! 10-02 
! IA-02 
! IA-02 
EC BANK BAG 
TINE-
04 J 13 
03U5 
03t 06 
02J52 
02M7 
02:40 
02M0 
02:37 
02:37 
02:37 
02U5 
02:15 
0 2 : 1 3 
02: 13 
0 2 : 1 1 
01:54 
0 1 : 5 1 
01:49 
0 1 : 1 1 
0 1 : 0 7 
0 1 : 0 7 
0 1 : 0 7 
01:06 
0 1 : 0 1 
0 1 : 0 1 
AGE 
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SI.P-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SI.P-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
SLP-
THE GUN WA' 
SL> CMTS 
3 ALSO A 
>.VERY DARK HAIR. , B 
,.DARK COMPLECTED, . 
: PIZZA HUT •.,2 SUSP ...1 
M MEX., ...CLEAN CUT NO PART 
I.UE SWEATSHIRT BLUE 
, . .230 COPIESJ 30 COPIES 
OF THE BLOG..N/& ON FOOT ...THE ONE WITH THE 
WHITE HAT, . ...WEAPON WAS A SMALL HANDGUN... 
IDE WHEN THE SUSPECTS LEFT..,NEVER SAW THEM GET 
OK REBUOGB 
AROUND THEIR FACES.. 
> . . , >P.CPE 
UNIT-/INC-
225/0018 
223/0018 
215/0018 
225/0013 
223/0018 
214/0013 
225/0018 
223/0013 
225/0013 
214/0013 
225/0018 
214/0013 
225/0018 
214/0013 
223/0018 
223/0018 
223/0018 
223/0018 
223/0018 
214/0013 
225/0013 
215/0018 
223/0013 
223/0018 
225/0013 
..BOTH SUSPECTS WEARING 
. ...ABOUT 4 00 IN CASH TAKEN
 M -* I^ J/i 
3 1/2' PAINTED WHITE ! - i ^ . " V y 
,. - ' - ' • « i _ * ' 
CT rflMMCM' r r* 
IN 
IN ^ ^ 
IN 
BZ REC 
BZ REC 
IN 
BZ EN REC 
BZ EN REC 
AT 
AT 
BZ 1999 W 
HZ 1999 W 
BZ 1999 W 
BZ 1999 W 
\>e 
FROM YSC 
N TEMPLE 
N TEMPLE 
N TEMPLF 
N TEMPLE 
BZ YSC W/JJUV X 
BZ EN YSC 
BZ 1859 W 
BZ 1S41 W 
BZ 1811 W 
AT 
AT 
AT 
AT 
EM 
EN 
W/l-JUV X 
700 N ON 
*•< - i 4 
~t£ivS% Oi^ 
CKNC SUSPS W/214 
CKMG SUSPS W/225 
CKNC SUSPS W/214 
CKMG SUSPS W/225 
THE STREET 
700 N UPSTAIRS 
700 N MAI -E RUNNING 
